Whispering Thoughts No 42 Taiwan – The Flashpoint? Part I: Immediate Background

Canberra, 26th March 2024                                                                                        

Taiwan, officially the Republic of China (ROC), is an island separated from mainland China by the Taiwan Strait. It is a democracy of 23 million people, governed independently since 1949. Mainland China, officially the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) asserts that there is only ‘one China’, themselves, views Taiwan as a renegade province and vows to eventually unify it with the mainland.

Beijing claims that an understanding, known as the 1992 Consensus—reached between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) party, then ruling Taiwan—is binding on Taiwan. However, both sides interpret the contents differently. Further, the Consensus was never intended to address the legal status of Taiwan. China insists that the Consensus is an agreement that ‘the two sides of the strait belong to one China and would work together to seek national reunification’. The KMT interprets it to mean that Taiwan, would be the ‘one China’, stemming from the KMT-drafted Taiwanese Constitution that recognises, China, Mongolia, Taiwan, Tibet and the South China Sea as part of the ROC (Taiwan).

Ironically, the KMT does not support Taiwan’s independence, consistently calling for closer ties with China. This position is unfathomable. The only way to understand this dichotomy is to believe that the KMT continues to harbour historic objectives of ‘defeating’ the Communists and ruling a unified and democratic China—a pipedream, to state in mild terms.

The situation is further complicated by the other political party in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has never endorsed the 1992 Consensus, although it wants to find a formulation that is acceptable to Beijing. The former President of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-Wen, in her inaugural speech in 2016 noted she was ‘elected President in accordance with the Constitution of ROC’, a KMT-generated document that twists the concept of ‘one-China’ in its favour.

In 2019, the Chinese President XI Jinping reiterated a long-standing offer to incorporate Taiwan into the mainland under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ policy used in Hong Kong—guaranteeing that Taiwan will preserve its political and economic systems and granting a ‘high degree of autonomy’. This policy is deeply unpopular among the Taiwanese, especially after China’s recent crackdown against democracy in Hong Kong, so much so that even the KMT have rejected the proposal.

From a legal and relationships point of view, Taiwan’s position in the international community is extremely precarious. In 1949, when the Communist Party of China wrested control of mainland China from the KMT-led forces, these forces retreated to Taiwan and the PRC was established in the mainland. During the next two decades, the world continued to recognise Taiwan as the government of all China. However, in 1971, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which recognised the PRC’s representative as the ‘only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations’, and expelled the ‘representatives of Chiang Kai-shek’, then ruling Taiwan.  

In December 1978, in a joint USA–PRC communique, the US recognised PRC as the ‘sole legal Government of China’; established formal diplomatic relations; severed diplomatic relations and abrogated its mutual treaty with Taiwan; and agreed to withdraw all US troops from the island by end-1979. However, the situation was complicated by the US Congress passing the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) that provides the legal basis for the US to maintain unofficial relations with Taiwan and continue to sell military hardware to it.

The three-cornered relationship is contradictory, murky, ambiguous and complex. The US approach is governed by its own interpretation of ‘one China’, based on three distinct sets of documents—the 1979 TRA; US–China communiques issued in 1972, 1978 and 1982; and the recently declassified ‘Six Assurances’ given by US President Ronald Reagan to Taiwan in 1982. Taken together they create a conscious policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’.

The US policy on Taiwan is based on five fundamental points. One, the US ‘acknowledges’ the Chinese position of ‘one China’ and that Taiwan is part of China. US officials use the words, not the spirit, of this statement to justify their support for Taiwan. They claim that the word ‘acknowledge’ only means that the US takes cognisance of PRC’s position but does not mean that it is accepted—essentially splitting hairs to validate their purpose and actions. Two, the US rejects the use of force to settle the dispute. Three, the US will continue to maintain cultural, commercial and other ties through the American Institute of Taiwan; four, it is committed to selling arms to Taiwan; and five, perhaps the most important point, it will maintain the ability to come to the defence of Taiwan, without having actually committed to do so—after all the US does not recognise or support Taiwan’s independence.  

The US strategic ambiguity was purposely created with the 1979 TRA and 1982 Assurances to maintain the status quo, a delicate balance of supporting Taiwan while avoiding confrontation with China. Geo-politics never stands still and in the past half-century the world circumstances have evolved. China is now vying for global predominance against the US. Almost in response, the US administration under President Biden has moved away from the awkward and ambiguous balancing act. The President has stated four times since 2021 that the US would come to Taiwan’s aid if China attacked. Senior officials have tried to dilute the impact of the statements—the subtle shift in the US stance is noticeable, the President makes the final call.

The main protagonist in this evolving drama is PRC, China. Unwittingly the US is forced to be reactionary to Chinese actions, while being unable to initiate any direct actions in the region. In any confrontation, having the initiative is half-the-battle-won, the other side will forever be on the backfoot, always playing catch up. The US is in this unenviable situation.

In 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping referred to the unification of Taiwan as ‘necessary for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation’. More demonstrative of the Chinese determination to unify was his statement that while China preferred peaceful unification through the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ proposal, ‘China will never promise to remove the use of force’. China’s Anti-Secession Law, passed in 2005, states that if Taiwan ‘secedes’ from China, or if the PRC concludes that possibilities for peaceful reunification have been exhausted, ‘the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’.

These are clearly ominous and unequivocal statements of intent and should not be construed as mere rhetoric. President Xi has set 2049 as the date by when China should reunify Taiwan and achieve the ‘Chinese dream’. With such unambiguous statements from China, the question is not whether, but when a real confrontation will erupt over Taiwan. Two recent developments underline the above analysis. One, the increasingly visible military modernisation of China and its growing assertiveness in global affairs. Two, the deterioration of China–Taiwan relations, especially since DPP President Tsai Ing-Wen was elected in 2016.

Tsai refused to accept her KMT predecessor’s formula of improved cross-strait ties with China. In response, China cut off official communications with Taiwan and resorted to increasingly aggressive actions—flying fighter aircraft into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone. A Chinese attack on Taiwan has the real potential to draw the US into a war with China, making the Taiwan Strait a global flashpoint. In January 2024, the DPP again won the Presidential elections. While the US–Taiwan relations will continue to be steady, cross-strait relations with China will face a potential storm, entering unchartered territory. Taiwan is now walking a tightrope, navigating a delicate balance while facing complex geo-political realities.

Part II of this analysis will look at the immediate future of Taiwan, China, US relations.    

Sanu Kainikara

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