The Marathas Part 14 Peshwa Balaji Rao Section IV The Battle of Panipat

Canberra, 28 February 2022

The Inexorable March to the Debacle

The army that was put together to avenge Maratha honour consisted at the core of the Peshwa’s personal soldiers who were surrounded and supported by soldiers owing allegiance to other Maratha sardars, chiefs. The total fighting strength was around 25,000. When Sadashiv Rao Bhau left Patdur for Delhi, this Maratha army did not resemble any part of the army that the great Shivaji had led into battle at the zenith of his power.

The Changing Face of the Maratha Army

The new Maratha army had four times the number of combat soldiers as camp followers—women, children, clerks, servants and shopkeepers, some even accompanying the army to do pilgrimage to the Hindu shrines in North India. Each chief employed a number of servants depending upon his status, to carry out petty jobs. The cavalry regiments, the mainstay of the Maratha army, brought with them several non-combatants essential for their efficient functioning—farriers, washermen, leather workers, drummers, messengers, water carriers, trumpeters, grooms. In a gathering of an army of 200,000 around 130,000 were non-combatants. It was calculated that the ratio between fighting soldiers and non-combatants would be one is to three. The Maratha army was now accompanied by the Pindaris, an irregular militia, about 20,000 strong.

The Pindaris

The Pindaris were irregular horsemen who accompanied and fought alongside the Maratha army and were permitted to plunder conquered regions in lieu of being paid. They added to the mass of cavalry that was available to a commander during a battle, although they were not considered as disciplined or trustworthy as the regular soldier. They were an integral part of the foraging Maratha army from the late 17th century onwards, gradually organising themselves into cohesive groups, each attached to a recognised Maratha chief. By the end of the century, as the chiefs themselves became weak and their control diminished, the Pindaris became a law unto themselves, conducting independent raids from their hideouts in Central India.

After the defeat of the Marathas in the Anglo-Maratha Wars (1803-04), the Pindaris operated mainly from the Malwa region under the tacit protection of the rulers of Gwalior and Indore, plundering British-held territory, mainly during the winter season. It is estimated that at the height of their strength, they numbered around 30,000 horsemen. With their activities becoming ever more hindersome, the British, under the Governor-General Lord Hastings, organised a campaign known as the Pindari Wars (1817-18), which finally managed to break-up the group completely.      

The Maratha camp was now a veritable township with permanent followers who continued to ply their trades like in a normal established town. The army on the march resembled more the emigration of a nation, guarded by their soldiers than the march of an army intent on subduing the enemies of the State or reducing challenges to the kingdom. Further, certain ‘domestic’ duties, such as grinding of the corn, could only be done by women and therefore the camp had more than 20,000 slave women accompanying them, to fulfill various roles including those of concubines.

By the time Sadashiv Rao started his march north, the Maratha leadership had started taking their families on distant campaigns. Such an arrangement would have been unthinkable in Shivaji’s army, where the leader and the soldier shared the rigours of the campaign equally. However, it must be admitted that the campaigns during Shivaji’s time were of much shorter duration with the army returning home after a few months in the field. The Peshwas’ campaigns could continue for years at a time. Therefore, the new Maratha army carried large and luxurious tents and screens, especially for the women’s quarters and for the senior leadership. The chiefs rode magnificent horses and wore gorgeous dresses made of cloth of gold to emphasise their status and relative position in the hierarchy. From a hardy guerrilla force that almost never faced defeat, where king and common soldier shared the same hardships and ate the same food, sleeping side-by-side on the hard ground, the Maratha army had become the epitome of a ‘Royal Army’, where the commander was far removed from the common soldier and perhaps unaware of his troubles and tribulations.

The essence of fighting for a common cause, based on Swaraj, had been lost for ever.        

Fourth Campaign – 1760

Bhau reached the Chambal with his army on 8th June 1760 and was joined by Malhar Rao Holkar and his forces. The Maratha expeditionary army was enormous—it was splendidly equipped by the Peshwa and well-arrayed, consisting of a core of 20,000 tested Maratha cavalry, 10,000 infantry and a sizeable artillery contingent. They were further joined by 30,000 soldiers from the Jat king Suraj Mal. However, there were two fatal weaknesses in the army. First, the slightly skewed command structure was not conducive to unity of command and therefore, the army although superficially magnificent, was not in reality the efficient fighting machine that it was meant to be. Experienced campaigners that they were, both Suraj Mal and Malhar Rao Holkar, understood the inherent weakness in the command hierarchy of the army. Lacking unity of command, the army floundered when it came to unity of purpose.

The second flaw was even more critical and finally led to the debacle at Panipat. The Maratha army under Sadashiv Rao Bhau had altered their basic battlefield tactics—they had dropped the traditional Maratha guerrilla tactics, which they had perfected over the years and excelled at, and which had won them numerous battles in the past. Instead, they had adopted new tactics and operational methods copied from the Europeans, especially the French. The nuances and intricacies of the European operational manoeuvres and battle-tactics were not clearly understood either by the generals, the subordinate middle-rung commanders, or the common soldiers. In the heat of battle, when faced with critical decisions to be made, the command structure struggled, with the soldiers unable to react naturally, as had been the case in the pursuance of guerrilla tactics. The Maratha soldier was born to fight as a guerrilla. This cardinal error proved calamitous for the great Maratha army.

Once Bhau reached North India, the politics of the time started to play out. With the Marathas coming into the Delhi/Doab region, Najib Khan the Rohilla leader persuaded Shujah-ud-Daulah, the nawab of Awadh, to join forces with Abdali. In his turn, Sadashiv Rao invited all the chiefs of North India to join him and assist in driving out the invaders from the sub-continent. This invitation was met by a deathly silence—the Rajputs were openly hostile to the Marathas, mutual trust between them having been irrevocably eroded through years of self-serving behaviour, extortion and downright meanness from both sides. Bhau even sent out feelers to the local Muslim chiefs with the invitation to join him in driving out the invaders, keeping the concept of a ‘unified India’ in the background. However, all the Muslim chiefs of North India, even the home-grown ones, now owed allegiance to their religion and not the motherland and sided with the Afghans. [Being a Muslim first and owing allegiance to a country/kingdom only after the due to the religion was paid is a trait of the followers of Islam that can be debated threadbare without ever coming to a conclusion regarding the relationship between religion and patriotism/nationalism. Since the topic is extraneous to the current narrative, it is not being explored any further in this volume.]

The absence of any significant support from the Hindu chiefs considerably weakened the Maratha finances and resources-base, in turn starting to dilute their military power. Since the Peshwa had deliberately curtailed Bhau’s power of command, the other subordinate Maratha commanders also started assert their equal status with Sadashiv Rao and differences of opinion regarding the plan of action started to flare up in the Maratha camp.

Moving North

Sadashiv Rao asked Govind Pant to arrange for boats to cross the River Yamuna since he was planning to attack Abdali and his allies in the Doab before the onset of the monsoon rains. He reached Sindkhed on 16th March 1760 and started to prepare for the expedition. At this stage the Maratha army was in arrears of payment and the soldiers, who were expected to equip themselves needed financial advances from the leadership to prepare themselves. Bhau moved to Burhanpur on the River Tapti and asked the Bundela kings to join him with their armies. On 12th April, he crossed River Narmada at Handia and planned to confront Abdali before the summer was over. However, the heavy siege guns and other artillery equipment being brought up slowed the progress, especially when they had to be moved through the rugged terrain of the Satpura and Vindhya ranges.    

On 16th May 1760, Ahmed Shah Abdali send a messenger, Hafiz Rehmat, proposing peace negotiations. However, the Maratha demands, remotely managed by the Peshwa who was totally devoid of an understanding of the ground realities, was so exorbitant that the peace proposals withered on the vine. Further, there was no agreement within the Maratha leadership of the Army of the North regarding what could be considered appropriate peace terms. The Marathas occupied Delhi on 2nd August 1760 and Shujah-ud-Daulah made another attempt at brokering peace between the Afghans and the Marathas. Although some discussions were held, this attempt too failed because of intransigence from both sides. Another development from this peace effort was that Suraj Mal, who had so far been providing materiel support to the Marathas, left the cause since some of the clauses of the peace negotiations were not to his liking. He had also started to suspect Maratha intentions towards his own territorial holdings. The Marathas were now left with no allies in North India, completely isolated and vulnerable in a hostile region.

This was Sadashiv Rao’s first foray into North India. He was unaware of the climatic conditions, the prevailing political circumstances, had no knowledge of the people and personalities involved, and had no information regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the potential adversaries he would encounter north of the River Chambal. His ignorance of the terrain was such that he did not even know the best route to traverse Malwa. Bhau was totally dependent on Malhar Rao Holkar for intelligence and information that were critical for the success of the campaign.      

From the available correspondence and records of discussions of the time it is clear that Sadashiv Rao Bhau had a vision of India as a Hindu Swaraj with its border at Attock, leaving Peshawar and beyond to the Afghans. It was presumed that the Marathas would administer the Hindu India, hence the appeal to all chiefs to combine their strength with the Marathas to drive out the foreign Muslim invaders. Bhau also had plans to declare his nephew Viswas Rao the Hindu Emperor of India. This action was held in check only by Malhar Rao Holkar who persuaded him to wait till Abdali had been defeated to make the announcement. Even though completely isolated and without a single friend in the region, Maratha power was now within a whisker of replacing the defunct and disgraced Mughal entity as the rulers of Hindustan.

At the same time as Sadashiv Rao was trying to gather like-minded chiefs under his banner, Abdali was also forging an anti-Maratha alliance along with few Rajput chiefs and princes, mainly Sawai Madho Singh of Jaipur and the Maharana of Udaipur. Both these princes were irritated with the high-handed manner of Maratha behaviour and the untrustworthy nature of Maratha dealings. It is a measure of the Maratha intelligence failure that Bhau was completely unaware of these overtures being made by Abdali and the shifting allegiances of some of the prominent Rajput princes.

Reasons for Lack of Support

Even though the Maratha commander made repeated appeals to the local Hindu chiefs to join him in the fight against the invaders, there was a lack of support emanating from the Rajputs, Jats and the Sikhs. There were three prominent reasons for this. First, the Hindu chiefs had witnessed several conflicts between powerful adversaries—invaders versus local kings—for control of North India and wanted to stay neutral in the on-coming battle, wanting to hedge their bets. They did not want to bear the brunt of a defeat in case their side came out the loser. Second, the domestic political scene in North India and Rajputana was in turmoil. The minor chiefs did not want to be away from their centres of power for extended periods of time since their absence could provide an opportunity for their cousins, brothers or other power-aspirants to usurp power. Supporting the Marathas would mean staying away from their capitals, which was not a viable option at this juncture.

The third and perhaps the most valid reason was that the Maratha warlords supported rival claimants to minor thrones in Rajputana without taking into account the legitimacy of any of the claims. Their only consideration was the amount of money a claimant was willing to part with for Maratha support. The Rajputs had lost confidence in Maratha integrity. The Maratha sardars on the other hand continued to display naked personal ambition and self-interest to be the paramount consideration in their decisions.    

Confused Priorities

Even though Bhau viewed the peace overtures from the Afghans with interest, peace was not possible because of the rigid stance of the Peshwa who would not cede even small parts of the Punjab to Abdali, nor recognise Najib Khan’ possessions in the Doab. The Peshwa was not in the field but ensconced in his palace in Pune, while Bhau, the commander on the spot was willing to negotiate the terms to arrive at an advantageous settlement. However, this was not to be. The Peshwa’s unrealistic and haughty stand did not take into account the ground realities and negated flexibility to Bhau in his dealings, dooming all prospects of an amicable settlement. The path to the impending debacle in Panipat was being paved by the Marathas themselves.

As the Marathas moved further to the north-east of Sironj, into Ahir country, villages to the rear started to rise in revolt, threatening the stretched lines of communications. Bhau could not turn back to quell the rebellions and should have taken this development as a warning of things to come in the future. However, he chose to ignore the situation, hubris, over-confidence and arrogance prevailed. He continued moving north, reaching Gwalior on 30th May 1760.

The capture of Delhi in early August restored the prestige of the Marathas, which had been at a low ebb after the defeat and battlefield death of Dattaji Scindia. By this time Delhi, having been plundered repeatedly by the Afghans and others, had nothing to offer the Marathas. Desperate to improve his financial situation, Sadashiv Rao consumed what little was left in Delhi, plundering the venerated tomb of the saint Nizam ud-Din (venerated at that time and even today after three centuries) and also some of the tombs of emperors gone-by. These actions did not endear the Marathas to an already hostile populace.

Even at this juncture, Abdali made a final attempt at settling an honourable peace between the Marathas and the Rohillas and returning to his country. This course of action would have been the most profitable and advantageous for the Marathas, and Bhau’s plan to declare Viswas Rao the Hindu Emperor in Delhi may indeed have come to fruition. However, Bhau, pushed by an egotistical Peshwa, and not a little arrogant himself because of his continuous battlefield victories and successes at Delhi, had lost touch with reality. Although peace talks continued well into September 1760, no agreements were reached. The Peshwa’s demands were always exorbitant and Sadashiv Rao’s demeanour one of an insufferable and arrogant autocrat.

The Maratha army, camped well north of Delhi, had by now stretched their supply lines and food was gradually running short. There was no tribute to be levied on a region that had already been wrung out of the last vestiges of resources and therefore, Maratha finances were also drying up. No local support was forthcoming after the withdrawal of the Jat leader Suraj Mal from the coalition. From being in a position of advantage to bargain during the peace negotiations, the Maratha leader was now in dire straits with no leverage to demand anything from the opposition. While the path to war was being overtly laid-out, the wherewithal to wage it was fast dwindling for the Marathas. If the Peshwa was aware of the gradual decline in the situation, he gave no indication of it.

On 17th October 1760 an event took place which turned the flavour of the impending conflict from a foreign invasion from the north-west to one between Hindus and Muslims in North India. On this day, Sadashiv Rao Bhau attacked the small principality of Kunjpura, ruled by a minor chief Nawab Najabat Khan who had been placed there by Abdali, and easily captured it. In a display of extreme and unprecedented cruelty, Bhau put the entire garrison to the sword, sparing only two kinsmen of the nawab who had revealed the location of the secret treasure house, under torture.

Several reports indicate that by this stage, Bhau had become insufferably proud and vain, taunting the older generals, such as Holkar, stating that they had never won any real battles. The resentment within the leadership simmered and the disunity of the army increased. The act of cruelty at Kunjpura riled Ahmed Shah Abdali, a devout Muslim. He now appealed to all Muslims—Shia and Sunni alike—in the sub-continent to flock to his banner and converted the approaching conflict into a religious holy war. He appealed to them to join him in defeating the infidel army, an appeal they responded to in hordes.

Disunity in Command

Both Holkar and Scindia, experienced commanders of warfare in North India, advised Sadashiv Rao to not proceed any further to the north, for two very valid reasons. They felt that it was not good form for the supreme commander of the Maratha forces, ranking only below the Peshwa, to take to the field—it elevated the status of the opponent, in this case Abdali, who was considered a mere Afghan warlord. With Bhau in command, even a minor battlefield defeat would have disastrous strategic consequences for Maratha status and ambition. Second, the subordinate commanders felt that Bhau taking the field indicated to the adversary the inability of the junior commanders to contain emerging challenges and thereby diminished their credibility—both in the eyes of the enemy and their own forces. In this case it directly impacted the status of both Malhar Rao Holkar and Janakoji Scindia.

Bhau’s advisors were a younger and less experienced group and opposed the advice of the older generals. They contented that both Holkar and Scindia had so far had complete freedom of action and therefore feared that their ‘misdeeds’ would be exposed under Bhau’s strict scrutiny. This was the reason for the older generals’ insistence that the Maratha commander did not proceed any further north. Heeding his own counsel, Bhau insisted on crossing the River Chambal much to the chagrin of Holkar who resented his advice not being taken. The division in command and even the dismemberment of the unity of purpose was now out in the open.

At this juncture in the narrative, few pertinent questions need to be asked and analysed. First, what was the ultimate objective of the Maratha invasion of North India during 1759-60? Did any of the senior leadership have a clear vision of what the Maratha kingdom would look like after the next 30 or 40 years? The disunity in command and purpose should have been visible to any astute observer of the Maratha progress, as should the gradual decline in overall power of the Marathas. The fact that this trend was not countered speaks volumes about the inexperience of the ‘new’ leadership that was driving the Maratha war machine. The military leadership had only been one or two generations in command and did not share a unified vision of creating a Hindu Maratha Swaraj. They were more tuned to building their own legacies and dynasties, rather than a greater Hindu empire. At the height of their power, the Marathas were ill-served by their leadership, which was unable to provide a broad vision of a unified empire ruled by and for the Hindu population of the sub-continent. This failure was to reverberate across the region for the next few centuries.

Relations with the Jats

Suraj Mal, ruling the Jat kingdom had been harassed by Abdali during his frequent invasions of the sub-continent. Further, the Afghan’s sacking of Mathura and Vrindavan and the religious persecution that accompanied the looting, exasperated and alienated the Jat king. Suraj Mal was a close friend of Holkar and had supported Dattaji during his forays into North India. Bhau wanted to create an alliance with the Jat king and invited him to the Maratha camp. Suraj Mal hesitated to accept the invitation since he was not certain about his personal safety in the Maratha camp and went only after Holkar had provided a personal guarantee of safety. This lack of trust in Maratha integrity and goodwill must have been galling for Sadashiv Rao, who prided himself on his impeccable character.

Once he reached the Maratha camp, Suraj Mal an experienced campaigner, immediately understood the drawbacks of the Maratha army. He shrewdly analysed the prevailing conditions and made three major recommendations to Bhau. One, to get rid of the ladies, baggage and the heavy guns that was impeding the rapid movement of the force and depriving it of its inherent agility. Two, to ensure that the lines of communication and supply were guarded and kept safe at all times, since he saw that the Maratha lines of supply were open and vulnerable to interdiction. Three, he advised that the Marathas avoid a pitched battle with Abdali at all costs and that they fall back on their time-honoured guerrilla tactics to harass and weary the invaders before delivering the coup de main. Holkar whole-heartedly accepted these recommendations as being sound. Bhau, however, rejected all of them outright, without even a discussion of their merits and the reasons for Suraj Mal’s recommendations. All reports of the time indicate that Bhau had by this time become vain, arrogant, and over-confident regarding the strength of his army and his own courage and battlefield prowess. He had also started to openly boast that he was the greatest Maratha commander, while deriding the earlier North Indian expeditions as being failures and their commanders as being of lesser calibre, while they claimed to be successful commanders. The allusion to the calibre of commanders was a direct insult aimed at Holkar and Scindia who had been part of the command structure of the previous expeditions. To add insult to injury, Sadashiv Rao openly belittled Suraj Mal, calling him nothing but a small zamindar who had no grasp of the greater capabilities of a large army such as the Maratha force.

By now both Abdali and Bhau were trying to woo the local chiefs and rulers to their respective sides, knowing that a battle was inevitable. Both were keen to have Shujah-ud-Daulah, the nawab of Awadh join them. Najib Khan the Rohilla chief was trying to lure him to join the Afghan coalition, while Bhau was harping on Shujah’s father’s personal friendship with the Peshwa and promising him the position of Vazir in Delhi after the invaders had been defeated and evicted from the sub-continent. In the end Najib succeeded in getting Shujah to join Abdali on 18th July 1760, with 7000 cavalry and an artillery contingent. The Marathas now did not have a single ally on their side. They also did not have sufficient number of boats to cross the River Yamuna and directly neutralise Shujah’s forces immediately in a pre-emptive attack before they joined the Afghan camp.

On 25th July 1760, the Marathas overran Delhi, entered the Red Fort on 2nd August and established themselves. Although not a great feat of arms or of military genius, taking over the Red Fort restored the prestige of Maratha arms, if in a lopsided manner, after Dattaji’s death and Holkar’s defeat in battle. Maratha chronicles state that Suraj Mal demanded that he be put in charge of the administration of the Delhi region, since it was contiguous with his kingdom. Bhau could not accept this proposal, especially since he was still trying to lure Shujah to his side with the offer of his being made the Vazir. Since the Marathas were interfering in Delhi politics with the avowed purpose of ensuring that foreign influence was negated, they had to keep the Indian Muslim faction of the Delhi court on-side and be seen as being well-wishers of the Mughals. Suraj Mal on the other hand was disliked by all Muslim nobles for his vociferous support of Hindus. This also added to Bhau’s inability to entertain Suraj Mal’s demands.

Suraj Mal felt slighted on various fronts and believed that a promise made to him had been broken by Sadashiv Rao. On 3rd August, the Jat king left the Maratha camp taking his forces with him, without informing Bhau. Attempts by other senior Maratha generals to affect a compromise were unsuccessful in the face of Bhau’s arrogance and intransigence. It is also mentioned in some reports that Suraj Mal, having witnessed first-hand the mis-management of the Maratha army could envision the on-coming disaster that was going to encompass it. Suraj Mal’s reasoned recommendations were not acceptable to Bhau and the Jat king did not want to be party to the debacle that he was sure would devour the Maratha army. With the departure of the Jats, Sadashiv Rao Bhau stood all alone in North India—he had no allies and could not expect any assistance from the Deccan.

Financial Troubles

Maratha power was underlined and reinforced by their large and efficient army. In turn, the army was maintained by the revenue that it collected from the conquered lands. The Chauth, Sardeshmukhi and other tributes that were levied were part of this system, which was meant to be not only self-sustaining, but also to be able to generate a surplus for other administrative purposes. The system worked well when the army was not very large or expensive to maintain and the conquered lands were fertile and yielded great output. Over a period of time, the system became strained for a number of reasons.

Tributes were promised from lands that were not fully in the control of the promising authority and therefore required the Maratha army to conquer them and then collect the tribute, which itself needed a large army. It became common practice among the Maratha sardars to take loans from various bankers in anticipation of forthcoming conquests. Even the Peshwa was not spared this indignity. It is reported that in 1759, the Peshwa was in debt for one crore rupees to various moneylenders. He tasked Bhau with collecting revenue to redeem this debt. The Maratha military machine was not in good financial health at this time.

The previous Maratha expeditions to the Delhi region had all, without exception, suffered from scarcity of food, fodder and money. Bhau faced similar challenges. In his army, previous arrears of the soldiers had not been paid in full and he needed a minimum of five Lakh rupees per month for the basic upkeep of the force. However, he was receiving less than one Lakh rupees as tribute and no unpaid balance was forthcoming. By 26th June, Bhau had run out of all funds and nothing more could be expected to be collected. The Doab, which traditionally provided food and fodder, was out of the control of the Marathas and no food was coming to Delhi from that region. The non-combatant camp followers numbered about 200,000, adding to the burden of already starving soldiers and horses. Suraj Mal’s observation and recommendation regarding the camp followers were astute. Taking over Delhi only aggravated the Marathas’ dire financial situation. As guardian of the Mughal family, Bhau was now responsible for their upkeep, salaries and stipends that itself were enormous.

A letter of 16th September 1760, written from Delhi to Pune states, ‘…even nobles are starving. There is starvation in the camp, but no revenue or loan is forthcoming.’ The Peshwa made a feeble attempt to divert funds from the Deccan, but it made no palpable difference to the situation on the ground. However, Sadashiv Rao Bhau remained optimistic about the immediate future and his ability to defeat the invading Afghan forces. The optimism seems strange on hindsight, the circumstances were actually very dire.

The Uneasy Status Quo

The Afghan army also faced some privations, but moved to Shahdra, near Delhi on the opposite bank of the River Yamuna. Thousands of Abdali’s animals died of starvation. Both sides were aware that they were in no shape to fight a decisive battle and so were biding their time in visual sight of each other. The sack of Kunjpura by the Marathas on 17th October 1760 gave Abdali the opportunity to convert a normal power struggle into one that supported the sacred cause of Islam. Now overtly Muslim and Hindu armies faced each other across the swollen waters of the River Yamuna.   

© [Sanu Kainikara] [2022]
All Rights Reserved
No part of this website/Blog or any of its contents may be reproduced, copied, modified or adapted, without the prior written consent of the author. You may quote extracts from the website or forward the link to the website with attribution to http://www.sanukay.wordpress.com/. For any other mode of sharing, please contact the author @ (sanukay@hotmail.com)

About Sanu Kainikara

Sainik School Kazhakuttam (Kerala), National Defence Academy 39/A, 108 Pilot's Course IAF, fighter pilot, QFI, FCL, psc, HACC, Voluntary Retirement as Wing Commander. Canberra-based Political and Defence Analyst specialising in military strategy, national security, and international politics. PhD in International Politics from University of Adelaide Executive Masters in Public Adminsitration (ANZSOG) Adjunct Professor, University of New South Wales, Distinguished Fellow Institute For Regional Security (IFRS) Distinguished Fellow Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS)

No comments yet... Be the first to leave a reply!

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: